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This panel asks the question: what forms of governance are promising to take up the challenge of 
addressing climate change at the scale and speed needed? In my original abstract, I intended to 
focus on one of my two current research projects which explores small-scale initiatives and 
projects in a comparative UK/Australia context, initiatives that are located in a hybrid space 
between social activism and social enterprise. However, while this project will, I believe, produce 
a fascinating and potentially provocative answers to the panel question in a broad sense, the more 
focused question of the forms of governance that will facilitate such initiatives is not something I 
can even tentatively answer as yet, and will have to await detailed analysis of this four-year 
project. For this reason, I am going to focus instead on a second project currently underway that 
fits the focus of this panel much more comfortably, particularly its first sub-question: What new 
forms of climate change governance have arisen over the last decades, and how do these differ 
from traditional approaches? The ‘new forms’ I will explore here are in essence bottom-up 
approaches that seek to avoid the risks of the stalled global treaty negotiations, while potentially 
still building a new more inclusive North-South basis for them if a post-Kyoto deal does 
eventually emerge. I cannot yet say whether these bottom-up forms of governance are likely to be 
better or worse in outcome terms than traditional Kyoto-style approaches, though our project’s 
focus on BASIC (large emerging economies, particularly South Africa and India) is one which at 
least promises a more inclusive global response than Kyoto’s historic focus primarily on Annex I 
countries.  
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Context and Introduction 
This panel asks the question: what forms of governance are promising to take up the challenge of 
addressing climate change at the scale and speed needed? In my original abstract, I intended to 
focus on one of my two current research projects which explores small-scale initiatives and projects 
in a comparative UK/Australia context, initiatives that are located in a hybrid space between social 
activism and social enterprise. However, while this project will, I believe, produce a fascinating and 
potentially provocative answers to the panel question in a broad sense, the more focused question of 
the forms of governance that will facilitate such initiatives is not something I can even tentatively 
answer as yet, and will have to await detailed analysis of this four-year project. For this reason, I am 
going to focus instead on a second project currently underway that fits the focus of this panel much 
more comfortably, particularly its first sub-question: What new forms of climate change governance 
have arisen over the last decades, and how do these differ from traditional approaches? The ‘new 
forms’ I will explore here are in essence bottom-up approaches that seek to avoid the risks of the 
stalled global treaty negotiations, while potentially still building a new more inclusive North-South 
basis for them if a post-Kyoto deal does eventually emerge. I cannot yet say whether these bottom-up 
forms of governance are likely to be better or worse in outcome terms than traditional Kyoto-style 
approaches, though our project’s focus on BASIC (large emerging economies, particularly South 
Africa and India) is one which at least promises a more inclusive global response than  Kyoto’s 
historic focus primarily on Annex I countries. I can also say, I think, that any capacity to respond via 
these emerging bottom-up governance structures at the speed and scale necessary is likely to be 
considerably hampered by the extent to which these bottom-up forms (do not) fit in existing 
institutional settings (another sub-question of the panel) , particularly settings not currently focused 
on the implications of climate change. I’ll conclude my paper by returning briefly to the other 
project, primarily simply to mark just how different a focus on developments ‘beyond the green 
wrapper’ that mix activism and enterprise would look – both in terms of promise and in terms of risk. 
Overview 
A regulatory architecture for climate change driven by a clear global agreement on collective action 
and assignment of responsibilities seems increasingly out of reach (if ever it was truly feasible). In its 
place, a patchwork of climate governance is emerging, that rests on a mix of nudges from above and 
political mobilization and innovative action from below. These oppositional constructions of “top-
down” targets enforced by compliance and “bottom-up” pledges subject to review, have dominated 
recent debates over climate governance.1  Following the Durban climate negotiations, it now seems 
likely that a bottom-up construction will prevail for the next 5-8 years, and a new round of 
negotiation will start to determine the contours of a post-2020 climate regime.2  
                                                
1 Dubash, N. K. and L. Rajamani (2010). "Beyond Copenhagen: Next Steps." Climate Policy 10(6): 593-599.; 
Victor, D. G., J. C. House, et al. (2005). "CLIMATE: Enhanced: A Madisonian Approach to Climate Policy." 
Science 309(5742): 1820-1821. 
2 Sterk, W., C. Arens, et al. (2011). On the Road Again: Progressive Countries Score a Realpolitik Victory in 
Durban While the Real Climate Continues to Heat Up. Wuppertal, Wuppertal Institute for Climate, 
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This outcome carries significance for the interaction between global and national regulatory regimes. 
A bottom-up construction leaves open the forms of national obligations, and significantly includes 
the use of “nationally appropriate mitigation actions,” (NAMAs) individual actions determined by a 
country to be nationally appropriate.3 This approach promises greater buy-in for domestic action, but 
also complicates both the processes through which these actions are recognized by the global regime, 
as well as the process through which they are reviewed. In short, the direction in which global 
climate governance is evolving increases greatly the complexity of interaction between global and 
national levels.  
One dimension of national appropriateness that is particularly likely to condition the actions 
countries take is the extent to which they contribute to inclusive growth. Indeed, the very genesis of 
NAMAs was an effort to accommodate the argument of many developing and industrializing 
countries that an over-attention to climate mitigation to the exclusion of development would 
disadvantage the poor in those countries.4 While the global debate is focused on whether fairness or 
equity is adequately internalized in the definition of commitments or actions across countries, a 
second level of concern is whether national governments actually act on preserving the interests of 
the poorest while formulating climate policy, or whether these concerns remain at the level of a 
global debating point.5 To avoid the “problem of disregard” requires institutionalizing mechanisms 
that allow countries to distinguish between policies that promote climate mitigation and inclusion, 
and those that do only one or other, are not straightforward. The challenge is further heightened by 
the fact that to draw these distinctions will require careful coordination between line ministries and 
new entities established to oversee climate policies.  
 
The larger project from which this paper draws is carrying out detailed empirical study of climate 
policies and politics in India and South Africa, with some desk research on other major emerging 
economies to provide a broader comparative context.  Empirically, we are concentrating on: 
• At national level, understanding mechanisms of coordination between line ministries and 
new entities or processes established to oversee climate policies within each case study, 
with relevant comparisons of any new entities or processes established at sub-national 
level 
• At cross-national level, comparative understanding of the institutional dimensions of the 
new entities or processes established to oversee climate policies  
• At transnational level, understanding the emerging shape and content of systems of 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV systems) of progress on carbon reduction 
goals that are being established at both national and international levels  
• In terms of policy substance, exploring the links between MRV systems and 
policymaking processes that take account of the tensions between carbon reduction, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Environment, Energy; Dubash, N. K. (2012). "Looking Beyond Durban: Where to from Here?" Economic and 
Political Weekly XLVII(3): 13-17. 
3 van Asselt, H., J. Berseus, et al. (2010). Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) in developing 
countries: Challenges and opportunities, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Werksman, J. and K. Herbertson 
(2009). The Legal Character and Legal Implications of NAMAs Under a Copenhagen Agreement: 50. 
4 This concern has spawned a considerable literature allocating both responsibility for and capability to 
address climate change across countries, and across different income levels across countries. See, for 
example, Chakravarty, S., A. Chikkatur, et al. (2009). "Sharing global CO2 emission reductions among one 
billion high emitters." PNAS Early Edition: 1-5; Baer, P., T. Athanasiou, et al. (2007) and The Right to 
Development in a Climate Constrained World: The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework. Berlin, 
Heinrich Boell Foundation, Christian Aid, EcoEquity and Stockholm Environment Institute. 
5 In India, for example, a concern has been expressed that Indian policymakers are “hiding behind the poor.” 
Chakravarty, S. and M. Ramana (2012). The Hiding Behind the Poor Debate: A Synthetic Overview. 
Handbook of Climate Change and India: Development, Politics and Governance. N. K. Dubash. New Delhi 
and London, Oxford University Press and Earthscan. 
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development and inclusion. We particularly focus on the conceptual notion of the ‘co-
benefits’ of climate policies 
 
To capture this complexity, emergent literature uses terms such as ‘polycentric governance of 
climate change,’6 and multilevel governance, 7’ both literatures that are good at capturing the the 
complex array of relevant empirical dimensions of the problem. This paper, however, focuses on the 
analytic benefits that regulatory literature can provide when applied to these issues. Regulatory 
literature is arguably often more immediately attuned to instrumental fixes and prescriptive 
approaches to institutional design than literature on polycentric or multi-level governance. The paper 
will explore three regulatory challenges of the ‘bottom-up’ approach: first, the use of technical 
independent expertise; second, tensions between national sovereignty and regulatory bite; and third, 
the challenge of designing MRV systems that are sensitive to equity and development issues as well 
as measuring carbon-reduction. It is to these MRV systems, twisted by my paper’s title into an active 
verb echoing their  
 
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
The 2007 Bali Action Plan (‘BAP’) was key in entrenching MRV as a crucial element of any new 
agreement dealing with climate change mitigation actions.8 That is, the BAP emphasised the fact that 
national climate change policy, whether that of Annex 1 or non-Annex 1 countries, should always be 
subject to international measurement, reporting and verification.9 Under the BAP, the following 
actions were specified as needing to be subject to MRV: 
• Mitigation commitments/actions by Annex 1 countries 
• Mitigation actions by non-Annex 1 countries  
• Financial support provided to non-Annex 1 countries by Annex 1 countries.10 
MRV can encompass a range of different activities:  
Countries engage in MRV whenever they measure emissions, estimate the impact of 
mitigation actions, publish emissions inventories, issue reports on their climate change 
mitigation efforts, or attempt to verify the accuracy of data on emissions or policy 
performance.11 
However, the BAP provided no clear definition of MRV and many questions about its nature remain: 
firstly, to what actions, specifically, will MRV apply? It is not clear whether MRV refers ‘to 
technology, finance and capacity building to be provided by developed countries, to all NAMAs in 
general, to only NAMAs for which there is support, or to both NAMAs and support.’12 It is clear that 
the answer to this question will only be resolved when a universal definition of NAMA is agreed 
upon.  
                                                
6 Ostrom, E. (2010). "Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change." 
Global Environmental Change 20 550–557. 
7 Schreurs, M. (2010). "Multi-level Governance and Global Climate Change in East Asia." Asian Economic 
Policy Review 5: 88–105. 
8 Claire Breidenich and Daniel Bodansky, ‘Measurement, Reporting and Verification in a post-2012 Climate 
Agreement,’ Pew Center for Global Climate Change (2009) 1. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
11 Angela Falconer et al, ‘Tracking Emissions and Mitigation Actions: Evaluation of MRV Systems in China, 
Germany, Italy and the United States,’ Climate Policy Initiative (2012) 1.  
12 Harro van Asselt, ‘Scientific Assessment and Policy Analysis: Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
(NAMAs) in Developing Countries: challenges and opportunities,’ Institute of Environmental Studies (IVM), 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 7.  
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MRV will play a critical role in a transparent climate change regime. Clearly, if non-Annex 1 
countries are to come close to fulfilling their commitments to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
reduction made under the Copenhagen Accord, there needs to be a way to objectively measure and 
evaluate their efforts to do so.  
The advantages of MRV are manifold. Obviously, ‘[i]t can provide an important means of tracking 
parties’ progress individually and collectively towards the Convention’s ultimate objective.’13 
Additionally, ‘the very process of measurement can facilitate parties’ actions by establishing 
baselines and helping to identify mitigation potentials.’14 That is, MRV can actually enable and 
encourage the implementation of NAMAs in the first place.  
Reporting can also enable international recognition of that particular action, can enhance actions 
through the provision of expert advice relating to improvements, and can lend legitimacy to a 
government that is actively taking part in an MRV process, thereby strengthening confidence in the 
national mitigation policies themselves.15 In this way, a non-Annex 1 country can actually attract 
international finance by participating in robust MRV processes and thereby showcasing its 
mitigation actions.16 In contrast, weak MRV systems ‘can undermine policy objectives, lead to waste 
of public resources, and diminish public confidence.’17 
Despite the clear advantages of MRV, it is still a controversial issue, because of concerns that 
international oversight will impinge on national sovereignty. For this reason, the international 
community has tried to emphasise the non-partisan nature of MRV; the Kyoto Protocol specifically 
framed the review of national MRV submissions as a ‘technical assessment of implementation’ 
rather than ‘a political judgment of performance.’18 
MRV of climate issues for the post-Kyoto phase is still being negotiated: this provides a window of 
opportunity for design of national MRV institutions to shape the international regime rather than vice 
versa 
MRV, then, turns out to be in very important ways, significantly about data, quantitative 
methodologies and measuring. However the verification aspect in particular tends to raise classic 
regulatory questions, as it frequently institutionalises a form of third-party review that calls to mind 
the logic of courts (Shapiro 1988), albeit animated by a much more statistical and Foucauldian 
rationality. And of course, even these statistical and data processes are carried out by institutions or 
personnel embedded in organisations, and the inter-relationships of such institutions and 
organisations often raises regulatory issues. We turn, therefore, to the three regulatory challenges 
outlined at the start of the paper, beginning with the use of technical independent expertise. 
Use of technical independent expertise  
At the domestic level, we are most interested in how will MRV be conducted, who will conduct 
MRV, and finally, when should MRV occur? We look at this beginning with a focus on new entities 
and processes at the national level. The key point here is that many emerging economies have 
established new entities to oversee economy-wide climate policies. The precise mechanisms of 
                                                
13 Ibid, 1.  
14 Ibid, emphasis added.  
15 Ibid.  
16 Anna Boyd et al, ‘South African Approaches to Measuring, Reporting, Verifying: A Scoping Report,’ Energy 
Research Centre, University of Cape Town (2011) 7.  
17 Falconer et al, above n 4, 1.  
18 Breidenich & Bodansky, above n 1, 11.  
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coordination between these entities and line ministries is not easily perceived from a paper exercise, 
but some observations can be made. 
Looking at SA, India, Brazil and Thailand (see diagrams below), all four have established essentially 
coordinating committees, though Thailand calls its entity a 'National Board' and India a 'National 
Mission'. These entities are populated by civil service personnel from key ministries, most often 
science, environment and/or energy. None of the four implement autonomous insulated agencies. 
Fig .1 Climate change institutional framework Thailand. 
 
Fig. 2 Climate change institutional framework South Africa. 
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Fig. 3 Climate change institutional framework India
 
Fig. 4 Climate change institutional framework Brazil.
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'mitigation' and 'adaptation', as well as technical capacity-building and diplomatic negotiations. This  
and even establishing, in 2007, an autonomous body charged with implementing carbon management 
policies (primarily in terms of information, measurement but also approval (eg of CDM projects) - 
the Greenhouse Gas Management Office. Established in 2007, senior civil servants serve four year 
terms, drawn from Transport, Environment, Energy and ONEP and working with five additional 
appointees from business, energy, forestry, science/technology and environment/conservation. 
Arguably, this institution is the closest to an independent regulatory agency in the landscape of new 
entities and processes emerging to oversee climate change policy. 
India has created an interesting entity that is in some ways sui generis. Entitled the National 
Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change (NMSKCC), it grew out of the National 
Action Plan for Climate Change formed under a high level government council headed by 
the Prime Minister.  The National Action Plan proposes actions in a ‘mission’ mode with 
tangible targets. The NMSKCC structure arguably reflects a conception of deliberative dialogue 
and political bargaining that mixes some (political) oversight with a dual level of expertise-led 
reframing of policy issues – both across sector siloes (focused on themes, impacts and technologies) 
and within them (via mirror sites within specific departments). As the diagram below shows, 
NMSKCC envisages an organisational matrix structure based on nodal centres coordinated 
through appropriate leadership models to implement the Mission elements and activities. A 
Programme Office with mirror sites in the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry 
of Environment and Forests and the Ministry of Earth Sciences would be effectively 
coordinating the implementation of mission activities:  
 
Fig 5: Mission Document: National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change 2010 
 
Ian Bartle has recently argued that institutions organized as independent regulatory agencies will 
play only a very constrained role in the overall policy game of reducing the carbon intensity of 
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economies (Bartle 2011).19 This certainly seems to be reflected in the emerging empirical picture of 
the countries selected here, and one could go further and say that they occupy varying positions 
along a ‘spectrum between rules and deals’ – a spectrum which I argue with Navroz Dubash in a 
forthcoming book with OUP (Dubash and Morgan 2013) is at the heart of the rise of the regulatory 
state in emerging economies. So one could argue that South Africa has made a macro-deal at a 
domestic level (preserve policy autonomy for energy) within which it is forging detailed micro-rules 
for carbon-sensitivity; India has created a hybrid structure that melds both political-deliberative 
processes and the forging and application of expert rationalities, blending them in an effort to 
reframe (rather than regulate) a broad range of ‘deals’ currently made across the policymakig 
spectrum. Finally, Thailand seems to be aiming implement international rules in a top-down manner 
via new entities, using the more familiar form of rule-based regulatory institutions, including 
certification initiatives (on which more below). 
Tensions between national sovereignty and regulatory bite  
The building of new entities at national level does not, even on a ‘bottom-up’ approach, eliminate the 
relevance of international oversight. One of the most contentious aspects of this issue is the use of 
expert review groups to verify the carbon reductions allegedly achieved by monitoried policies. This 
has been trialled before in the context of ‘supported NAMAs’ (ie mitigation policies in developing 
countries financed by developed countries). From 1999 to 2007 progress on these (summed up in the 
national communications provided to under the Kyoto Protocol) was assisted by a Consultative 
Group of Experts (CGE) . The CGE aimed at improving the preparation of national communications 
which was able to provide informal feedback to non-Annex 1 parties. It was ‘a standing body of 24 
experts, nominated by regional groups, with expertise covering all aspects of national 
communications.’20  Although its politically contentious nature meant it has not met since 2007, its 
reinstatement has been recently urged by Breidenich & Bodansky, who suggest it acquires more 
members with GHG mitigation expertise who will then review NAMA reports on an ad hoc basis.21 
The sensitivity of BASIC and other emerging economies to being reviewed by third parties 
potentially dominated by non-national interests also plays out in relation to unsupported NAMAs (ie 
actions that are funded at a domestic level or through bilateral aid). The Copenhagen Accord 
established that unilateral or domestic NAMAs of non-Annex 1 countries would be subject to 
‘International Consultation and Analysis’ (ICA). ICA reports are generally submitted in between 
national communications, which are submitted every four years. ICA was consciously a less 
stringent standard of review than International Review and Analysis (IRA) that would apply to 
Annex I countries. At the Cancun conference, it was decided that ICA would involve non-intrusive, 
no-penalty review of biennial reports, through a ‘facilitative sharing of views,’ and would result in a 
summary report.22  
These shades of varying stringency, so sensitive in the political negotiations, show that even before 
the deployment of expertise is crystallised in enduring institutions it remains highly politically 
                                                
19 Ian Bartle (2011), 'Regulatory approaches to climate change mitigation', in David Levi-Faur (ed), Handbook on the politics of 
regulation , Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 
20 Ibid, 24.  
21 Ibid, 24.  
22 Para 64, UNFCCC 2010. 
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contentious – so much so that it is deeply unlikely any sort of international quasi-regulatory agency 
would ever develop to adminster MRV at the international level. Yet when discussions of ‘credited 
NAMAs’ are had (ie policy measures by non-Annex I countries that will participate in transnational 
emissions trading systems), we can see that this ‘limit case’ immediately imports a more top-down 
command and control vision of a regulatory context. As Okubo et al 2011 argue,23 for a NAMA to be 
‘credibly creditable’, it will be essential to have access to centralized, transparent data collection 
systems, an effective sector organization (e.g. no or a negligible number of informal actors) and 
feasibility of differentiating impacts of policies. In effect, the tradability of policy packages on a 
global emissions markets requires policies to be ‘bankable’ in carbon reduction terms, potentially 
attracting many of the conundrums and dilemmas that have accompanied financial regulation over 
the past fifteen to twenty years. Added to this is the fact that in an emissions trading context, expert 
review groups can ‘adjust’ methodologies used by national entities, and thus have considerable 
power – not unlike that of akin to international arbitration panels perhaps. The legitimacy challenges 
made to such panels suggest similar political dynamics could arise, making it unsurprising that recent 
literature has proposed certification as one possible response. 
Certification systems have recently been suggested as a way forward in the area of MRV 
(Niederburger and Kimble 2011)24 to dilute the political contentiousness of ‘foreign’ expertise being 
deployed while still preserving the facilitative potential of MRV. They argue that a certification 
scheme for national climate management systems, which would require countries to establish a 
climate policy, set national goals and timetables, secure resources to implement related national 
actions and track their progress over time, would support rather than police developing country 
climate policy progress. What does recent literature tell us about the regulatory efficacy of private 
global certification schemes in other areas, particularly forestry, an area which continues to be 
central to carbon reduction initiatives?  
Two important points emerge from this literature. First, certification is a popular middle road  in 
political terms. As a mechanism of social regulation, it has a dual appeal both to companies who 
prefer private self-regulation and and to social movements seeking to building new political 
institutions at the transnational level (Bartley 2011).25 In the proposal to implement certification as a 
means of implementing MRV, both are present – certification would be a voluntary choice for states, 
and as such would preserve national sovereignty of developing countries but the third party-review 
involved would reassure all stakeholders that “Parties are indeed making continual progress towards 
achieving their low-carbon performance objectives” (Niederburger and Kimble 2011: 50). With no 
detail as yet on the precise actors that would carry out audits against the standard or the substantive 
content of the standard, little more could be said as this point, but the political fault-lines are familiar. 
Standards for private industry certification point the way – several options have been developed here 
that, although all ‘private and voluntary’ at one level, vary in terms of greater influence of states 
(ISO 14-064), private corporate actors (Carbon Disclosure Project) and civil society (the GHG 
                                                
23  Yuri Okubo, Daisuke Hayashi and Axel Michaelowa, “NAMA crediting: how to assess offsets from and additionality of policy-
based mitigation actions in developing countries”, Greenhouse Gas Measurement and Management (2011) vol. 1 pp 37-46 
24 Anne Arquit Niederbergera & Melinda Kimble, “MRV under the UN climate regime: paper tiger or catalyst for continual 
improvement?” Greenhouse Gas Measurement and Management (2011) vol. 1 pp 47-54 
25 Bartley, Tim (2011) “Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation,” pp. 441‐452 in Handbook on the. Politics of Regulation (ed. 
David Levi‐Faur), Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 12 
Protocol developed by the World Resources Institute in dialogue with the World Business Council 
on Sustainable Development.). For certifying policy processes (as opposed to industry emissions), 
the World Resources Institute, keeping a close dialogue with civil society, is already developing a 
standard against which to evaluate policy measures, and ISO is doing early work on a standard 
articulating the requirements of a management system. Regulatory competition between these 
various approaches is likely to dominate the field of climate policy integration for some considerable 
time to come, whether or not a ‘top-down’ deal emerges by 2015. 
Equity-sensitive ways of MRV’ing carbon reduction 
The final regulatory challenge for a ‘bottom-up’ approach to the integration of climate change 
considerations on an economy-wide basis (and perhaps the most intractable) is the question of doing 
this in an equity-sensitive fashion. Two possible routes emerge here: taking account of ‘co-benefits’, 
and implementing ‘equity reference frameworks’.  
“Co-benefits” as defined in the Indian National Action Plan on Climate Change are measures that 
“promote development objectives while also yielding co-benefits for addressing climate change 
effectively” (Government of India 2008, section2). In a working paper on how to operationalise this 
notion (Dubash et al 2012)26, a deliberative and consciously semi-qualitative approach is taken that 
proceeds in two-steps, as detailed below. The second of these steps is clearly embedded in regulatory 
design, creating a process that seeks to marry quantitative and qualitative dimensions, as well as 
technical and deliberative perspectives. This mix is quoted in some detail below to give a sense of 
the texture of a space ‘between rules and deals’:   
   The first step is a co-benefits analysis that assesses whether and to what extent a given policy 
 objective, if achieved, delivers on co-benefits across multiple outcomes. For example, we seek 
to  establish if a particular effort at policy-making is likely to simultaneously enhance economic 
growth,  inclusion local environmental gains and GHG mitigation, or whether there are trade-offs 
across these,  and the extent of trade-offs. The outcome of this analysis can provide the basis for 
screening out  deeply problematic policy objectives whose other impacts outweigh any GHG 
mitigation benefits they  may have, and screening in those that simultaneously achieve multiple 
objectives. This step is  designed to be relatively straightforward to implement, and looks only 
at the desirability of a policy  objective, setting aside considerations of cost and 
implementability. 
  
The second part of the analysis introduces pragmatic considerations toward implementation -- an 
implementation analysis. This step requires first detailing policy instruments (regulation, taxes, 
creation of markets, investment promotion incentives, labelling etc.) with which to achieve the policy 
objectives that are selected using the co-benefits analysis. The implementation analysis looks at 
transactional and financial costs of implementation. … Based on the analysis, the user assigns a 
qualitative score on a scale of -2 to +2, with 0 implying neutral impact on the outcome and +/- 1 
weak positive or negative impact and +/- 2 strong positive or negative impact. It should be noted  that 
the value of this score lies not in the absolute number but in the relative impact on the outcome (vis-
à-vis other outcomes) sought on a -2 to +2 scale…. An essential element of the methodology is that 
all qualitative arguments and scoring should be subjected to a process of consultation and feedback 
to identify weaknesses in the argument and/or disagreements over the scores. This process of 
discussion and deliberation should involve a wide range of stakeholders, including technical experts, 
                                                
26 Navroz K. Dubash, Raghunadan, Girish Santi and Ashok Sreenivas, “A Climate Change Policy for India: Exploring a Co-Benefits-
Based Approach”, Working Paper, December 2012 
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policymakers, industry, users and civil society and local communities, in order to capture all 
perspectives. 
An equity reference framework’ is a mechanism  for benchmarking against principle-based criteria 
that operationalise notions of fairness. It aims to deploy a “universal application of egalitarian 
principle to guide a distributive view that seeks to address historical, current, and potential inequities 
in respect of contribution to emissions, and as such is corrective in character, and distributive in 
approach. In respect of the metric/non-metric chasm, a stepwise consideration is proposed, where 
there is an ex ante assessment of fair effort in a non-binding framework, with binding commitments 
proposed by parties and therefore catering to national circumstances”  (Ngwadla 2013).27 By 
explicitly integrating the question of fairness into institutional design for climate policy, it requires 
an assessment of the moral dimension of climate change policy (though whether with reference to 
need or responsibility, charity or culpability, remains open-ended and contentious). At the same time, 
by employing a process-based framework to operationalise these considerations, it becomes feasible 
to open up a space ‘between rules and deals’ (Dubash and Morgan 2013) which could act as a 
regulatory infrastructure for such considerations. Lessons from process-oriented regulation in other 
areas could be applied here.  
 
In a recent overview of literature in this area, however, (Gilad 2011),28 two important points emerge. 
First, the challenges of actually securing change in practices on the ground are noted. Management 
systems are more likely to change than actual street-level practices, even when this form of 
regulation is well-adapted to the contexts it emerges in. Second, in the context of explicitly 
distributive issues, the need to acknowledge the limits of ‘neutral spaces’ or technical expertise 
intensifies. If distributive issues are not addressed directly through directly redistributive financial 
initiatives, they tend to reappear in the political dynamics of a regulatory regime (Haber 2010). 
Moreover, building on insights from the literature on cities and climate change, it is arguable that co-
benefits and equity considerations are best addressed at ‘lower’ levels of governance, and that city-
based climate policies are most easily adapted to these considerations.  
Carbon-exclusive MRV systems at international level almost by definition will struggle to integrate 
co-benefits, and arguably successful city-level policies are usually framed as primarily addressing 




If cities and small-scale social enterprises really have the greatest potential, we are back to the other 
project that I was originally going to present on. And I want to close by considering: IS there any 
relationship between local ‘social actionists’ (one of my interviewee’s terms, trying to capture a 
sense of visceral production, of making something rather than refashioning information) and MRV 
specialists? They inhabit utterly different spaces. But ultimately both want to ambitiously restructure 
production, consumption and exchange, reinventing economic frameworks  – and building new 
relationships is key to both. And what to me is fascinating is that arguably law is pretty marginal to 
both projects, at least in the traditional sovereign and dispute settlement sense. Yet law as 
governmentality (entwined deeply with finance) is absolutely central to ‘being MRV’d’. Moreover 
those MRV systems both facilitate and, paradoxically, substitute for relationships between strangers 
or fictitious entities. In contrast, in the sharing economy and collaborative consumption (the focus of 
                                                
27 Xolisa Ngwadla (2013)  “Equitable Access to Sustainable Development Relevance to negotiations and actions on climate change”, 
MAPS (Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios) Research Paper No.10) 
28 Gilad, S. 2012. “Process-Oriented Regulation: Conceptualization and Assessment” , In D. Levi-Faur ed. Handbook of the Politics of 
Regulation, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham 
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the other research project), it is precisely the reanimation of relationships – even between strangers – 
that is engendering excitement.29  
A striking comment from a recent ‘outsider’ review of regulation and governance literature (Arup 
2013) notes: “With the decline in traditional sources, for instance the vibrancy of left politics, the 
autonomy of national governments and the solidarity of local communities, it often seems that 
regulatory studies has been the focus of those who wish to civilise capitalism”. If MRV is emptied 
out of those three factors, it will arguably lose its capacity to continue to ‘civilise’ the carbon-
rapaciousness of ‘business as usual’. On the other hand, if left politics can energise certification 
initiatives, if the deployment of expertise can be articulated within the purview of national 
government autonomy, and if the bottom-up approaches actually shift shared collective practices at 
the local level within communities of interest, whether territorial or policy-functional, then we may 
achieve the ‘speed and scale’ necessary. If not, then MRV and a bottom-up system may just become 
another fiendishly complex niche of carbon market governance for the ‘big end of town’.  
    
     
    
    
    
    
 
                                                
29 Unless, as cynics might have it, it is simply that technology is facilitating and making visible the social (collaborative) 
underpinnings of competition, and that the technology is currently substituting for relationships – that this, moreover, will pass once 
risks emerge, and we may see the sharing economy being MRV’d in due course too and consequently slowing down. 
